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Abstmct - This article presents an efficient method to calculate 
system reliability with CCFs (Common-Cause Failures) by apply- 
ing the factoring (total probability) theorem when the system and 
its associated class of CCFs are both arbitrary. Existing methods 
apply this theorem recursively until no CCF remains to be con- 
sidered, and so might be time-consuming in computation. Our 
method applies such a theorem only once and can be carried out 
in two steps: 1) determine each state in terms of the occurrence 
(or not) of every CCF in the associated class, to regard it as a 
pseudo-environment and to calculate its probability or weight; 2) 
determine each resulting subsystem of the system under the en- 
vironment and calculate its reliability as in the “no CCF” case and 
take the weighted sum of such reliabilities, viz, the system reliabili- 
ty. This method is in terms of a Markov process and requires only 
the occurrence rate of each CCF to obtain the probability of each 
environment and only the failure rate of each component to ob- 
tain the system reliability under each environment, hence is prac- 
tical, efficient, and useful. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For ease of computation, system reliability evaluation usual- 
ly assumes that components are subject to self-failures only. 
But components are often further subject to common-cause- 
failures (CCFs). Failure to consider CCFs results in exag- 
gerating system reliability. Hence many methods of system 
reliability evaluation with CCFs have been developed [l-181. 
Most calculate the reliability and/or availability of a “parallel” 
system of 2, 3, or 4 components in terms of Markov processes 
[2-71, some calculate the availability of several special systems 
in terms of more general regenerative processes or the tech- 
nique of supplementary variables [8-lo]. 
Those few methods which are concerned with an arbitrary 
system are all in terms of Markov processes [ 1 1 - 181. Chae & 
Clark [ 111 considered s-identical components and presented a 
method using the inclusion & exclusion rule under the assump- 
tion that different failures (self- or CCFs) are s-independent. 
Dhillon [lo, 121 and Fleming [13] also considered s-identical 
components and presented a method in terms of a parameter 
which is the fraction of self-failures among total failures. Such 
methods should be further improved before they can be applied 
to any general case. Other methods calculate system reliability 
and/or availability by applying the factoring (total probability) 
theorem. They are distinguished into the following three classes: 
1. Each CCF is confined to a subset of either a minimal 
cut [15] or a “parallel” subsystems of s-identical components 
2. Those subsets of components which are subject to CCF 
3. Completely arbitrary [ 16, 181. 
Although methods in [16, 181 belong to class 3, they all 
have to apply the factoring theorem recursively until no CCF 
remains to be considered, and so might be time-consuming. In 
order to save computation time or improve the efficiency, any 
method which applies the factoring theorem should apply it only 
once. Although methods in [15, 171 apply such a theorem only 
once, they belong to classes 1-2. Besides, they are cumbersome 
and also receive some dispute on logic consistence due to the 
complexity induced by considering repair times. We present 
a method which belongs to class 3; it applies the factoring 
theorem only once in the following two steps: 
1. Look into the class of CCFs first; regard each state in 
terms of the occurrence (or not) of every CCF as a pseudo- 
environment E and calculate its weight Pr {E}. 
2. Calculate Pr{system normal)E} which is the system 
reliability under E (as in the no CCF case) and the system 
reliability is then the weighted sum C E  Pr{E} Pr{system 
normalIE}. The {Ci : 1 I i s m }  of subsets of components 
which are subject to CCF must be listable such that C1, C2,. . . , 
CK, Uj2KCj are pairwise disjoint and CK+I,C~+2,...,Cm are 
not pairwise disjoint for a unique 01Ksm. 
~ 4 1 .  
are pairwise disjoint, vs not pairwise disjoint [ 171. 
2. NOTATION, DEFINITION AND BASIC 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Notation 
CCF common-cause failure 
S system identifier 
S( 
ponents i , j ,  ..., k 
pi reliability of component i when i is isolated 
c CCF of components in the subset C 
{ Ci: 1 I i sm} the class of all subsets of components in S 
which are subject to CCF, c ’ s  
. . . ,E )  the subsystem of S after deleting those com- 
r, {x,, x2,...,x,} 
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if <-first happens among Ci’s for i > k  (during [OJ] )  
if no < happens for all j > K (during [O,t]) 
Ps system reliability with CCF 
P i  
hi 
system reliability when CCF is not considered at all 
failure intensity of a Poisson process for isolated com- 
y = 
ponent i 
occurrence intensity of a Poisson process for C, h,; 
Other, standard notation is given in “Information for Readers 
& Authors” at the rear of each issue. 
If K = m, then the environment is denoted by ( ~ 1 . ~ 2  .... A n )  
Or (xiJ2,. . . J m ; t ) -  
1.3 Calculate the weight of each (xK;y;t): 
Basic Assumptions 
1 .  System and its components, when isolated, transit bet- W(xK;Y;t) = [ n l s i s K  wi(xi;t)l .w(y;t) ween two states, N (Normal) and F (Failed). 
2. Besides self-failures, components are subject to CCF, 
G, for l s i s m .  
3. The occurrence of the failure (self-failure) of each 
isolated component i follows a Poisson process with failure in- 
w;(xi;r) ~ exp(-Xc;L ifx; = 0 i 1-exp( -Ac;), if xi = 1 
- 
(1.3-1) 
(1.3-2) 
tensity hp 
4. The occurrence of each c follows a Poisson process 
with occurrence intensity hq. Such Poisson processes are 
s-independent . 
5. Components self-failures are s-independent whenever 
no CCF exists. 
is the probability that c occurs (does not occur) during [O,t] 
if X; = 1 (resp. xi = 0). 
c; Ai,K = X 
i > K  
exp( -A;,KO 7 i f y  = 0 (1.3-3) 
(h~j/A;,~).(l-exp(-A;,kt), if y = j 
3. THE APPROACH TO CALCULATE SYSTEM 
w(y;t) = RELIABILITY 
1 . 1  List C1,C2,. . ,Cm according to: 
C1, C2,. . . , CK & Uj,Sj  are pairwise disjoint 
CK+ 1 , c K + 2 , .  . . ,C,,, are not pairwise disjoint 
for a unique K with 0 I KI m first, and where K = 0 means 
that C1,C2, ..., Cm are pairwise disjoint (This can always be 
done according to lemma A in the appendix). Then C1, C2, . . . , 
C,,, satisfy the following properties; 
i .  The occurrence (or not) of C1,c2, ... ,cK are 
s-independent 
ii. The occurrence of CK+ l 9 c K + 2 ,  C , are s-independent 
in the sense that the occurrence of any one, say q, 
will prevent for CiCi # 4 from happening. Hence, 
for each j >  K,  we let -fitst denote the event that < 
occurs first among those C’ for all x >  K. 
iii. For each j >  K, the occurrence of cl, c,.  . , cK, 
CK+ l-first,. . . , G-first are s-independent. 
- 
1.2 Determine each environement from C , ,  C2,. . . , C,, 
Ck+l, ..., C,,, by a vector ( x K ; ~ )  or (xK:y;t) such that - 
1 ,  if C happens (during [OJ] )  
2. Calculate reliability in 3 sub-steps: 
2.1 Determine each subsystem SI ( x K ; y )  of S by condition- 
ing on the environment (xK;y) 
2.2 Calculate its reliability PiI ( x K , y )  (t) .  
2.3 Calculate - 
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
Figure 1 .  A Bridge Network 
4.1 Example 1 
No CCF happens in figure 1. Hence component self-failures 
are s-independent, and so - 
I 
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where S ( 3 ) denotes the subsystem of S by conditioning on the 
normal state of 3, pi(t)  = e-'i' for all l ~ i s 5  and - 
Pi(,) = (P1+P2-PlP2) - (P4+P5--P4?%) 9 
Pi(3)  = PlP4+P2P5-PlP2P4P5. 
Let A, = for convenience. 
Example 2 
Two CCFs 5 & 34 happen in Figure 1. 
Step 1 
1.1 C1 = {1,2} & C2 = {3,4} (m = 2 & K = 0)  
1.2 Environments are: (O,O), (l,O), (0,l) & (1,l). 
1.3 Weight of each environment: 
Figure 2. Reliability Evaluation of Example 1 Illustrated in the Modified 
Success Tree 
w(0,O;t) = wl(O;t)w2(O;t) = exp(-(X12+hg4)t) 
w(1,O;t) = w1( l;t)w2(0;t) = (l-e~p(-h~~t))-exp(-h~~t) 
1.3 w(0;O;f) = wl(O;t) - e ~ p ( - ( X ~ ~ + h ~ ~ + X ~ ~ ) t )  
= exP(-(b5 +A12 +h13+h23 
w(0;2;t) = Wl(o;t) (X12/(h12+h13+h23)) 
w(0,l;t) = wl(0;t)w2( 1;t) = exp(-X12t) -(1-exp(A3,t)) * (1-exp(-(X12+X13+X23)t)) = exp(-X45t) 
w(1,l;t) = wl(  l;t)w2( 1:t) = (1-exp(-hl2t)) 
* (l-exp( - A340 ) 
The procedure to calculate the system reliability is illustrated 
via the modified success tree in figure 2. 
Example 3 
Step 2 
2.1 Resulting subsystems are: Sl(0;O) = S, S1(0;2) 
= s(i,Z), s1(0;3) = s(i,3), sl(i ;o) 
= s(4,5), s1(1;2) = s(i,2,4,5), s1(1;3) Step 1 
1.1 
1.2 
= s(i,3,4,5), s1(1;4) = ~(2 ,3 ,4 ,5 )  C1 = {4,5}, C2 = {1,2}, C3 = {1,3} & C4 = {2,3} 
( m = 4 & K = 1 )  2.2 P'sl(o.0) = P i  
YUNG ET AL.: EVALUATION OF SYSTEM RELIABILITY WITH COMMON-CAUSE FAILURES, PSEUDO-ENVIRONMENTS MODELS 331 
The procedure to calculate the sytem reliability illustrated via 
the modified success tree in figure 3. 
Figure 3. Reliability Evaluation of Example 3 Illustrated in the Modified Suc- 
cess Tree 
Suppose that Xi = 0.05 for all 1 si15 and hc = 0.005 for 
all CCF c's. Then - 
Example t = 10 t = 100 t = 200 
1 P i ( ' )  .6695 9.140 x lo-'  4.122 x 
2 P ; ( t )  .6229 4.446 x lo-' 1.037 x lo-'  
3 P t ( r )  .5791 2.034 x ,0205 x 
AKPPENDIX 
In order to determine each pseudo-environment from C1, 
C2,. . ,C,, we need Lemma A. 
Lemm A:  
C1,C2,. .  ,Cm may be re-identified as D1,D2,. . . ,Dm so that: 1) 
D1,D2, ..., Dk & U i 2 ~ + 1 D ;  are pairwise disjoint and 2) D K + ~ ,  
DK+2, . . .  ,D, ar not pairwise disjoint for a unique integer K. 
Proof: If all Ci's are pairwise non-disjoint, then K = 0, 
otherwise, choose a D1 from them so that D1 is disjoint from 
the rest of them. Now, if the rest of them are not pairwise dis- 
joint, then K = 1, otherwise, choose a D2 from them so that 
D2 is disjoint from the rest of them. Continuing in athis way, 
we can finally reach the unique integer K. Q. E. D. 
In order to calculate the weight of each pseudo-environ- 
ment or to prove lemma E, we need to porve lemmas B,C,D. 
Lemma B: 
Let X & Y obey exponential distributions with intensities p & 
v respectively. Suppose that X & Yare s-independent. Then 
(1 -exp( - p  + v ) t ) .  r{Xst ,XsY) = -
P+V 
CL 
Proo$ Pr{Xst,XIY} = jb j; p.v.exp(-(p-x+v.y))dy 
-dx = p / p + v  (1-exp(-p+v)t). Q. E. D. 
Lemma C: 
Let X1,X2 , .  . & X,, be s-independent random variables and X 
be the minimum of such Xi follows exponential distribution 
with intensity pi for each 1 I i I n. The X follows exponential 
0 
Lemma D: 
Let C1, C2,. . . , C, be pairwise non-disjoint . The 
distribution with intensity Ci p i .  
vi [1 -e  - ( E s q  P r { c  occurs first during [ O J ] }  = - 
E, vs 
Pr{no CCF during [ O J ] }  = e- (Esvs) t  
Pro05 The first equation follows by applying Lemmas B & 
C to the facts that yi = min{zjj:j#i} is exponentially 
distributed with pdf Esgi vs and Pr{C, occurs first during [ O J ] }  
= Pr{Xist, X i s & } .  Q. E. D. 
According to Lema D, we have: 
Lemma E: 
For each j >  K, 
R{nO <.Occurs during [oJ] f o r d  i > K }  = exp(-(Ei>KXCi)t)) 
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